Reconciling history with the nation? Historicity, national particularity, and the question of universals by Schneider, Axel
Reconciling history with the nation? Historicity, 







Leidschrift, jaargang 18, nummer 3, januari 2004 
                                                
Recent years have witnessed a considerable resurgence of interest in 
nationalism and the structures and processes of collective identity and 
memory. This renewed focus is not only linked to the revival of nationalist 
movements after the end of the Cold War, but also hinges on the phe-
nomenon of globalization and our understanding of modernity.1
Based on an interpretation of the historiography of two outstanding 
Chinese historians – Chen Yinke (1890-1969) and Fu Sinian (1896-1950), 
who both have been labeled the Chinese Ranke2 – I argue, first, that major 
problems with regard to modernity that early modern Chinese thinkers were 
facing can better be understood on the foil of German historicism, and that, 
second, some of the so-called conservative thinkers do show a much 
stronger awareness of the problematic of modernity then previously has 
been recognized. However, this awareness is not spelled out explicitly, but is 
hidden within the debates on language, culture, and history. 
By ‘modernity’3 I refer to the ongoing process of historicization and, 
hence, relativization of norms and values once conceived as timeless and 
universal. In Europe, this process has been characterized by a decline of 
 
* Originally published in: Historiography East & West vol. 1:1 (March 2003) 117-136. 
1 For an analysis of this topic with regard to present discussions in the PR China, 
see: Axel Schneider, ‘Bridging the Gap: Attempts at Constructing a ‘New’ 
Historical-Cultural Identity in the PRC’, in: East Asian History, vol. 22 (December 
2001) 129-144. 
2 For a detailed analysis of Chen Yinke’s and Fu Sinian’s historiography see: Axel 
Schneider, Wahrheit und Geschichte: Zwei chinesische Historiker auf der Suche nach einer 
modernen Identität für China (Wiesbaden 1997) and Wang Fan-sen 王汎森, Fu Ssu-
nien: A Life in Chinese History and Politics (Princeton 2000). 
3 On the development of views of history and the problem of historicity in 19th 
and 20th century Europe, see: Jeffery Andrew Barash, Martin Heidegger and the 
Problem of Historical Meaning (Dordrecht 1988). For a reappraisal of the history and 
impact of historicism, see: Friedrich Jaeger and Jörn Rüsen, Geschichte des Historismus. 
Eine Einführung (München 1992), and Jörn Rüsen, Konfigurationen des Historismus, 
Studien zur deutschen Wissenschaftskultur (Frankfurt am Main 1993). 




metaphysical and theological assumptions concerning the structure of the 
world and a concomitant decline of traditional assertions of ontological and 
epistemological coherence. The world was less and less conceived as one 
finite world, but rather turned into a ‘meta-world’, that was dissolved into a 
diversity of possible worldviews4 – a term in itself symptomatic of the change 
that had taken place. 
Kant’s philosophy was but a first step towards what Max Weber 
would later call ‘disenchantment’. In his epistemological turn, Kant 
transferred the structures of the world into a priori structures of 
consciousness, thus preparing the ground for the ongoing process of 
decentering the world. However, history understood as the historicity and 
relativity of human existence not yet played any role – Kant’s world was still 
one world, even if turned epistemological.  
But not later than Hegel, history became the central issue and 
Western thought ever since has been characterized by various attempts at 
reconciling historical relativity with universal norms. However, Hegel’s view 
of history was not only based on the conviction that historical particulars 
had to be reconciled with a universal spirit, it also provided a teleological 
path of the articulation of the Spirit in world-history, thereby ultimately 
subordinating the individual to universal necessity. 
In the course of the decline of German Idealism, Hegel’s grand 
vision and the underlying premises of Enlightenment and Idealism were 
increasingly challenged. From Herder’s philosophy of individual cultures, to 
Ranke’s historicism, and to Dilthey’s view of history based on a philosophy 
of life, we encounter various attempts to guard against relativism by holding 
particularity in esteem, without abandoning the quest for history as a mea-
ningful whole. It was not until after the First World War that these approa-
ches were superseded, culminating in the growing awareness of an 
irreconcilable chasm between contingent facts and normative tenets. 
Heidegger, for example, refuted any attempt at defining a metaphysical 
                                                 
4 The term ‘worldviews’ aptly refers to the reflexivity of modern consciousness and 
hints at the cultural plurality and historical relativity, which is so characteristic for 
modernity. On the modernity of ‘worldviews’, see: Martin Heidegger, ‘Die Zeit des 
Weltbildes’, in: Martin Heidegger Holzwege (6th edition; Frankfurt am Main 1980) 73-
110. For a definition of the typical modern view of culture, see: Karl Mannheim, 
‘Über die Eigenart kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis’, in: Idem, Strukturen des Denkens 
(Frankfurt am Main 1980) 44-50. 




absolute, declaring the historicity of human existence to be the only 
universal left.5  
None of these philosophers and historians reestablished a universal 
teleology of history. Universal reason, the backbone of Enlightenment, was 
explicitly denied a dominant role in history and became itself historicised. 
Most of the historicist and hermeneutic approaches in fact opposed and 
replaced the Enlightenment idea of progress by the notion of ‘development’ 
(German: Entwicklung). Based on an analogy with individual organic growth, 
the idea of development did not entail a hierarchy based on the progressive 
realization of knowable norms.  
In the light of these historical developments of reflecting on 
‘historical development’ I suggest to conceive of modernity as a 
phenomenon that cannot be adequately characterized by a totalizing notion 
of the progress of reason or any other absolute.6 Instead, I believe that it 
should be understood as marked by the intrinsic tension between attempts, 
on the one hand, at resurrecting some sort of philosophical, theological, 
historical, or scientistic certainty, and, on the other hand, the consequences 
deriving from the verdict of Nietzsche, that God is dead and mankind is 
liberated from and condemned to live without firm metaphysical or 
theological foundation.7  
 
Turning to China, however, it is striking first, how much our image of 
modern Chinese intellectual history has long been dominated either by May 
Fourth historiography8 or by state-official ideologies, and that, second, 
                                                 
5 Barash, Martin Heidegger, 21-23 and 54-73. On Herder, see: Brian J. Whitton, 
‘Herder’s Critique of the Enlightenment: Cultural Community versus Cosmopolitan 
Rationalism’, in: History & Theory, 27:2 (1988) 146-168. On Dilthey, see: Manfred 
Riedel, ‘Einleitung’, in: Wilhelm Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den 
Geisteswissenschaften (5th edition; Frankfurt am Main 1997) 9-80. 
6 In the field of China research a recent example of an understanding and hence 
critique of modernity as the progress of reason by referring to Hegel’s philosophy 
of history can be found in: Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questio-
ning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago 1995). 
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Die fröhliche Wissenschaft’ 343, in: Idem, Werke in zwei 
Bänden I (6th edition; München 1990) 489-490, and Idem, ‘Götzen-Dämmerung, Die 
vier grossen Irrtümer’ 8, in: Ibidem, II, 351-352. 
8 The intellectuals of the ‘May Fourth Movement’ of 1919 argued in favor of far-
reaching cultural and political change modeled along the lines of Western 




Chinese intellectuals opposed to these interpretations have been stigmatized 
as conservative or even as reactionary.9 Yet, taking into consideration that in 
Europe it were the very conservatives who made important contributions to 
clarifying the notion of historicity and the problem of modernity,10 paying 
more attention to their Chinese counterparts will help us to arrive at a more 
balanced understanding of the interrelation between historicity, national 
particularity and the problem of universals.  
Given the fact that historically the writing of history in China had 
always enjoyed a higher status than in the West,11 it is no wonder that 
historiography found itself at the center of modern debates, not only 
leading to a considerable reorientation of Chinese identity, but also to a 
growing awareness of the challenge posed by modernity. Already from the 
late Qing period onwards, Western ideas began to influence the conceptions 
and eventually the very language by which Chinese intellectuals tried to cope 
with that challenge.12 Though historiography initially had been heavily 
                                                                                                             
modernity. They pleaded for the adoption of ‘science’ and ‘democracy’ and 
demanded to reject Chinese tradition in an iconoclastic and total manner. 
9 This is reflected in the scarcity of Western historiography on these intellectuals. 
For the only monographs on these intellectuals, see: Guy Alitto, The Last Confucian, 
Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley 1979), and Idem, 
Wenhua shoucheng zhuyi lun (On Cultural Conservatism; Taibei 1986). See also: 
Charlotte Furth ed., The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in 
Republican China (Cambridge, Mass. 1976). Conservative intellectuals like Du 
Yaquan, post May Fourth Zhang Shizhao, Chen Huanzhang, the Xueheng group 
including Wu Mi, Mei Guangdi, Liu Yizheng, Miao Fenglin and others are still not 
very well known in the West and more often than not lumped together under the 
general term of conservatism. 
10 Mannheim, Konservatismus, Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Wissens (Frankfurt am Main 
1984). 
11 Chinese historiography has been at the center of political and 
cosmological/philosophical interest in China ever since the first millennium BC. It 
has enjoyed a degree of importance and continuity that singles it out as the most 
continuous and voluminous historiographic tradition and has been formally 
institutionalized as a state institution since the Tang Dynasty (8-10 century AD). 
For analysis of fundamental characteristics of Chinese historiography see Yves 
Chevrier, ‘La servante-maîtresse: condition de la référence à l’histoire dans l’espace 
intellectuel chinois’, in: Extrême-Orient, extrême-occident, Cahiers de recherches comparatives 
IX, La référence à l’histoire (1987) 117-144. 
12 Lydia H. Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated 
Modernity, China 1900-1937 (Stanford 1995) and Wolfgang Lippert, Entstehung und 




influenced by the evolutionary worldview,13 already in the 1910s the 
situation had changed dramatically as various imported concepts of 
historiography together with indigenous traditions shaped a discourse that 
was very lively and pluralistic. 
Although both Chinese historians I discuss here have followed 
dissimilar methodologies and agendas of research, both have been described 
as having been influenced by Ranke.14 Therefore a comparison of their 
historiography will not only shed light on the processes of the adoption and 
appropriation of Western thought and its intermingling with indigenous 
approaches, but can also serve as an example of how Chinese historians 
tried to cope with the modern problem of historicity, the crisis of identity 
and the task to redefine China’s position in the world.  
                                                                                                             
Funktion einiger chinesischer marxistischer Termini: Der lexikalisch-begriffliche Aspekt der 
Rezeption des Marxismus in Japan und China (Wiesbaden 1979). 
13 As was the case with Liang Qichao’s and Zhang Taiyan’s early historiography. 
See: Liang Qichao 梁啟超, ‘Xin shixue’ 新史學 (New Historiography), in: Xinmin 
congbao 新民叢報 (New People’s Miscellany) 1, 3, 11, 14, 16, 20, see: Yinbingshi wenji 
飲冰室文集 (Collected Works of the Ice-Drinker’s Studio) vol. IV/9 (3rd edition; 
Taibei 1983) 1-11. For Zhang Taiyan, see: Wang Fansen, Zhang Taiyan de sixiang 
(1868-1919) ji qi dui ruxue chuantong de chongji 章太炎的思想 (1868-1919) 
及其對儒學傳統的衝擊 (The thought of Chang Taiyan and his attacks on the 
Confucian tradition; Taipei 1985) 189-199, and Furth, ‘The Sage as a Rebel: The 
Inner World of Chang Ping-lin’, in: Idem ed., The Limits of Change, 113-150. A 
detailed comparison of their respective views of history can be found in Schneider, 
Wahrheit und Geschichte, 68-82. 
14 On Fu Sinian as a Chinese Ranke, see: Zhang Zhiyuan 張致遠, ‘Lanke de 
shengping yü zhuzuo’ 蘭克的生平與著作 (Ranke’s Life and his Writings) in: Ziyou 
Zhongguo 自由中國 (Free China) 7:12 (16 december 1952) 10-15; Sun Tongxun 
孫同勛, ‘Tan Fu Sinian xiansheng de shixue’ 談傅斯年先生的史學 (On Fu 
Sinian’s Historiography) in: Lishi yuekan, 20 ( January 1989) 8-13, there 10b, and Xu 
Guansan 許冠三, Xin shixue jiushinian, 1900- 新史學九十年 (90 years of New 
Historiography) I (2nd edition; Hong Kong 1989) 206-207. On Chen Yinke as a 
Chinese Ranke, see: Wang Rongzu, Shijia Chen Yinke zhuan 史家陳寅恪傳 (Biogra-
phy of the Historian Chen Yinke; Taibei 1988) 53-57. 




Before turning to Chen Yinke’s 
and Fu Sinian’s historiography, it is 
necessary to clarify Ranke’s concept of 
historiography. He usually comes to 
mind as the founder of empiricist 
research emphasizing the critical 
evaluation of archival material, and 
aiming at objective knowledge of the 
past. His often-quoted slogan that the 
aim of research is to find out ‘wie es 
eigentlich gewesen’, represents this 
image.15
However, his methodology was 
nothing but a means to a higher end. 
The historicist Ranke argued against the 
enlightenment-approach to history, ca-
stigating it as superimposing abstract 
theories on history, thereby violating its 
very individuality. Not philosophy, but 
theology was the basis of his view of 
history. He assumed that every epoch is 
characterized by its ‘particular tendency’ and its ‘own ideal’. Thus, the aim 
of writing history was to elucidate the differences between the individual 
epochs, and to show how every epoch, although individual and 
incomparable, was the manifestation of God’s will. The methodological 
conclusion was to envision historical research as a hermeneutic project. The 
prerequisite attitude towards the object of research was to be one of Mitge-
fühl, that is ‘compassion’ or ‘empathetic understanding’. The historian was 
to become aware of the individuality and the ideals of an epoch through 
intuition and spiritual contemplation.16  
Leopold von Ranke (*1795-
†1886). Source: www.badw.de 
/deuweb/akad2.htm
                                                 
15 On this very influential empiricist image of Ranke and the extent to which it 
partially misrepresents Ranke’s historiography, see: George G. Iggers, ‘The Image 
of Ranke in American and German Historical Thought’, in: History and Theory, 2 
(1962), 17-40. On the similarly one-sided reception of Ranke in Japan, see: Stefan 
Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley 1993) and Margaret Mehl, 
History and the State in Nineteenth-Century Japan (New York 1998). 
16 Rüsen, Konfigurationen des Historismus, 18-134. 




But how to make sense of these 
apparently self-contradictory demands to 
carry on disinterested, objective research 
and, at the same time, to contemplate the 
very individuality of history as the 
expression of divine providence? For 
Ranke, to be sure, this was not a 
contradiction. Understanding history as the 
ever individual manifestation of God’s will, 
almost inevitably led him to the demand 
not to subdue a past to present, subjective 
needs of making sense of the past. On the 
contrary, meaning was to be found in the 
past and the only way to relate this 
meaning to one’s own present was through 
God. This understanding of the relation 
between historical particularity and the 
religious universal was his way of 
defending the particular, that is Germany, 
against what he perceived as the arrogance 
of universal enlightenment, that is the 
French revolution, without being forced 
into relativism.  
Fu Sinian (*1896-†1950) was 
born in Liaocheng, Shandong-
province. He performed
research at the university of
Berlin, Germany, and served as
the president of Taiwan State
University. Source: Fu Sinian,
Collected works of Fu Sinian (Fu
Sinian Xuanji) (Tabei: Zhuanji 
wenxhe chubanghe 1971) 
Yet, at the end of the nineteenth century, many German historians, 
already far removed from Ranke’s worldview, had lost faith in divine 
providence. They either did – in a positivist manner – put more stress on 
the methodological aspects related to the treatment of primary sources, or 
they were looking for other ways of relating the historical to the universal as 
was the case with Dilthey’s philosophy of life.17
 When returning to the reasons why Chen Yinke and Fu Sinian have 
been labeled the ‘Chinese Ranke’, it is most interesting to note that both 
argue for a very different philosophical and methodological approach to 
history.  
Fu,18 a leader of the May Fourth Movement, was mainly oriented 
towards the positivist sciences. He advocated a view of history as 
                                                 
17 Barash, Martin Heidegger, 54-74. 
18 On Fu Sinian, see: Wang Fansen, Fu Ssu-nien, and Schneider, Wahrheit und Ge-
schichte. 




determined by geographic-climatic factors comparable to laws in the 
sciences, a view he applies to explain how the Chinese nation came into 
being.19 Besides, Fu envisions history as characterized by the universal 
progress of mankind towards a rational, scientific mode of thought. He 
depicts Xunzi and Kaozheng (考證) empiricism as precursors of scientific, 
rational thought, which thus loses its Western coloring and is being raised to 
universal status.20 Referring to Ranke21 and Kaozheng methodology he 
strongly argues against any kind of interpretation, and formulates the task of 
the historian as exclusively consisting of the verification and organization of 
the source material, allowing the bare facts contained in the material to 
speak for themselves. Accordingly, he opposes the use of any kind of theory 
or view of history and fiercely condemns any involvement of the historian 
in politics.22  
                                                 
19 Fu Sinian 傅斯年, ‘Yi Xia dongxi shuo’ 夷夏東西說 (Theory of the I in the East 
and the Hsia in the West) in: Zhongyanyuan qingzhu Cai Yuanpei xiansheng 65 sui 
lunwenji, Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan waibian, 1:1 (January 1933) 1093-1134, see: Fu 
Sinian quanji 傅斯年全集 (Complete writings of Fu Sinian, henceforth: FSNCC) III 
(Taibei 1980) 822-894. 
20 Fu Sinian, Xingming guxun bianzheng 性命古訓辨證 (Disputation and Vindication 
of the Ancient Glosses on ‘Nature’ and ‘Destiny’) 2 vols. (Shanghai 1940) see 
FSNCC II, 491-736. 
21 Fu Sinian, ‘‘Shiliao yu shixue’ fakanci’ ‘史料與史學’ 發刊辭 (Editorial to 
‘Historical material and historiography’) in: Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan waibian 2, 
Shiliao yu shixue (Historical Material and Historiography) 1 (November 1945) see: 
FSNCC IV, 1402-1404. 
22 Fu’s most important article on methodology is: Fu Sinian, ‘Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo 
gongzuo zhi zhiqu’ 歷史語言研究所工作之旨趣 (Working Intentions of the 
Institute for History and Philology) in: Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan (Bulletin of the 
Institute for History and Philology) 1:1 (October 1928) see FSNCC IV, 1301-1314. 
Other texts are: Fu Sinian, ‘Liu Fu ‘si sheng shiyanlu’ xu’ 劉復‘四聲實驗錄’序 
(Foreword to Liu Fu’s Record of Experiments concerning the Four Tones; January 
1923) see: FSNCC III, 935-941; Idem, ‘Zhongshan daxue yuyan lishixue yanjiusuo 
zhoukan fakanci’ 中山大學語言歷史學研究所周刊發刊詞 (Editorial of the 
Weekly Bulletin of the Institute for Philology and History of the Sun Yat-sen 
University) in: Zhongshan daxue yuyan lishixue zhoukan 1:1 (January 1, 1927) 1; Idem, 




This short summary reveals that in his case China’s history as a 
particular history was muted by subordinating it to universal laws. Thus, he 
tries to establish a Chinese identity by fitting China into world history as 
determined by characteristics that are universal, but in fact are of Western 
origin. While he ventures to find precedents of the correct, scientific world 
view in Chinese history, he forsakes the very possibility to devise an answer 
to the question of what is ‘typically Chinese’. 
Although Fu referred to Ranke only once, it is not unlikely that he 
equated his approach with that of Ranke, namely the empiricist Ranke. The 
problem of how to define and protect one’s particularity without being 
trapped in relativism and historicity could hardly be resolved within the 
limits of this approach. In fact, Fu’s approach subjugating China to 
universal laws that to a certain extent allow the prediction of its future can 
be interpreted as implying the de-historicization of China’s past. At the 
same time, however, Fu satisfied his nationalist agenda portraying China as 
an equal member in the world of nation-states, and was, contradicting his 
own methodological stipulations, again and again driven into political-
nationalistic action,23 a fact that was not only reflected in his many 
                                                                                                             
 ‘Zhanguo zijia xulun’ 戰國子家敘論 (Systematic Discussion of the Philosophers 
of the Warring States) (1927-1928) see: FSNCC II, 417-422; Idem, ‘Yu Gu Jiegang 
lun gushi shu’ 與顧頡剛論古史書 (Letter to Gu Jiegang discussing Ancient 
History) in: Zhongshan daxue yuyan lishixue zhoukan (Weekly Bulletin of the Institute 
for Philology and History of the Sun Yatsen University) 2:13-14 (January 23 and 31, 
1928) see: FSNCC IV, 1521-1522; Idem, Shixue fangfa daolun 史學方法導論 
(Introduction to the Methods of Historiography; n.p. 1928) see: FSNCC II, 335-
392; Idem, ‘Kaoguxue de xin fangfa’ 考古學的新方法 (The new methods of 
archaeology) in: Shixue (Historiography) 1 (December 1930) 195-206, see: FSNCC 
IV, 1337-1347; Idem, Zhongxi shixue guandian zhi bianqian 中西史學觀點之變遷 
(The Change of Historiographical Points of View in China and the West), written 
around 1928, published first in Dangdai (Contemporary) 116 (December 1995) 64-
71. 
23 Schneider, Wahrheit und Geschichte, 33-56. 




journalistic publications24 and some methodological texts,25 but also in some 
of his historiographical writings of the 1930s.26  
Chen Yinke, in contrast to Fu, stressed cultural particularity assuming 
that all cultures are of equal status, thus implying a universalistic 
perspective. His research was based on the assumption that Chinese history 
is characterized by the gradual development of its particular ‘national spirit’ 
(minzu jingshen 民族精神). He identified the Confucian social ethics as its 
core (Sangang wuchang 三綱五常),27 without hypostatizing it as an 
unchanging essence.28 He focused on the ongoing cultural exchange 
between China and foreign peoples, in order to show that China’s national 
spirit has always been in the making by assimilating external influences.29 
                                                 
24 The texts are too numerous to be quoted here. Suffice is to refer to his 
participation in the debate on traditional Chinese medicine. See: Fu Sinian, Guanyu 
‘guoyi’ wenti de taolun 關於 ‘國醫’ 問題的討論 (Discussion on the Problem of 
‘National Medicine’; August 27, 1934) see: FSNCC VI, 2322-2329; Idem, ‘Suo wei 
‘guoyi’ 所謂 ‘國醫’ (The so-called ‘National Medicine’) in: Dagong bao (The 
Impartial; August 5, 1934) see: FSNCC VI, 2299-2304.  
25 Fu Sinian, ‘Xiantan lishi jiaokeshu’ 閑談歷史教科書 (Idle Talk about 
Schoolbooks for History), in: Jiao yu xue (Teaching and Studying) 1:4 (October 1, 
1935), see: FSNCC IV, 1357-1372. 
26 Fu Sinian, Dongbei shigang 東北史綱 (Outline of the History of the Northeast; 
Beiping 1932). For a detailed analysis of Fu Sinian in comparison with other 
historiographical trends of the 1920s and 1930s see: Schneider, Wahrheit und Ge-
schichte, 146-176. 
27 The Sangang wuchang (Three Bonds and Five Relationships) refer to the 
relationship between ruler and official, father and son, and husband and wife, and 
are the concrete expression of Confucian social ethics. 
28 Chen Yinke 陳寅恪, ‘Wang Guantang xiansheng wanci bing xu’ 
王觀堂先生輓詞並序 (Poem with Foreword commemorating Wang Guantang 
[i.e. Wang Guowie]) written in 1927, see: Hanliutang ji, Yinke xiansheng shicun (Extant 
Poems from Mr. Yinke, Collection from the Hall of the Winter Willow), Chen Yinke 
xiansheng wenji 陳寅恪先生文集 (Collected writings of Mr. Chen Yinke, 
henceforth: CYKWC) ) vol. I:1, appendix II (Taibei 1981) 6-11. 
29 His most important historiographical works are his monographs on ‘medieval’ 
Chinese history; see: Chen Yinke, Tangdai zhengzhishi shulungao 唐代政治史略稿 




Chen claimed that only the receptivity to external stimulants had guaranteed 
the persistence of Chinese cultural identity by preserving its core, though in 
different historical manifestations. Any notion of an unchanging national 
essence contradicts this concept of continuity by change in the same way as 
the unqualified adoption of foreign ideas alien to the Chinese national spirit 
does.30  
What guarded him against cultural relativism was the notion of ‘the 
universality of abstract ideals’ (chouxiang lixiang zhi tongxing 
抽象理想之通性). Referring to Plato he recovers the lost universal ground 
not by proclaiming a humanistic Chinese civilization superior to the West 
(as e.g. Zhang Junmai), or by referring to universal science (as e.g. Fu 
Sinian), but by assuming the formal universality of human attachment to 
‘abstract ideals’, which do vary from culture to culture, and change in the 
                                                                                                             
(Draft of a Description and Discussion of the Political History of the Tang Period; 
Chongqing 1943) see: CYKWC III:5, 1-159; Idem, Sui-Tang zhidu yuanyuan lüelungao 
隋唐制度淵源略論稿 (Draft of a Brief Discussion of the Origins of the 
Institutional System of the Sui- and Tang; Chongqing 1944) see: CYKWC II:4, 1-
158. 
30 The most prominent formulation of this methodology and his view of history can 
be found in: Chen Yinke, ‘Feng Youlan Zhongguo zhexueshi shang ce shencha 
baogao’ 馮友蘭中國哲學史上冊審查報告 (Two Reports on the Examination of 
Feng Youlan’s History of Chinese Philosophy) written in 1930, see: CYKWC II:3, 
247-249; Idem, ‘Feng Youlan Zhongguo zhexueshi xia ce shencha baogao’ 
馮友蘭中國哲學史下冊審查報告 (Two Reports on the Examination of Feng 
Youlan’s History of Chinese Philosophy) written in 1933, see: CYKWC II:3, 
250-252; Idem, ‘Du Ai jiangnan fu’ 讀哀江南賦 (Reading the Fu Mourning for the 
South) in: Qinghua xuebao, Qinghua 30 zhounian jiniankan (Qinghua Journal, Issue in 
Memory of the 30th Anniversary of Qinghua University; July 1939) see: CYKWC 
II:3, 209-217; Idem, ‘Chen Yuan xiyuren huahua kao xu’ 陳垣西域人華化考序 
(Foreword to Chen Yuan’s Investigation of the Sinificaton of the People of the 
Western Regions) written in 1935, see: CYKWC II:3, 238-239; Idem, ‘Chen Shu 
Liaoshi buzhu xu’ 陳述遼史補注序 (Foreword to Chen Shu’s Supplementary 
Annotation of the History of the Liao) written in 1942, see: CYKWC II:3, 234-235; 
Idem, ‘Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao’ 支愍度學說考 (Investigation of the Teachings of 
Zhi Mindu) in: Lishih yuyan yanjiusuo jikan waibian, 1:1 (January 1933) 1-18, see: 
CYKWC I:2, 141-168. 




course of history, but have to be 
protected in order to safeguard the 
identity of the respective culture.31
Accordingly, the historian’s task is 
seen to consist in contributing to the 
recollection of the national spirit, a goal 
he has to achieve by adopting a 
historicist, hermeneutic methodology. 
His research should be based on the 
meticulous examination of historical 
sources, aiming at the ‘empathetic 
understanding’ (tongqing zhi liaojie 
同情之了解) of the historical 
manifestations of the national spirit. 
Then, and only then, may the historian 
venture to evaluate history from a 
present day perspective.32 The correlate 
of this was the demand, that the 
historian should stay aloof from politics. 
Because history is no longer regarded as 
the manifestation of absolute principles, 
the historian looses his former, 
eminently political position to actualize
historiography. Chen thus dissolves the pr
action and assigns the historian the new role
memory and cultural identity.33
Chen’s view of history is thus a form
his emphasis on the particular manifestation
contents of these ideals vary from culture to
in different ways in history. Hence, the 
culture cannot be integrated into world histo
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tion, or by means of universal norms as implied by Fu’s approach.34 It is 
Chinese history that speaks to Chen who thereby wants to establish an 
identity that can only be integrated into the larger world through respect for 
each culture’s commitment to its specific ideals. 
In Chen’s case it is much more difficult to assess Ranke’s influence. 
Though he never referred to Ranke, later historians claimed to recognize 
such an influence.35 However, if we take into consideration that Chen had 
studied in Germany for many years, it may well be justified to assume that 
he knew of Ranke and the tradition of German historicism.36 Chen’s 
position surely was closer to the hermeneutic Ranke, who struggled with the 
problem of the relationship between the individual and the universal and 
who opposed any notion of teleological progress. However, this should not 
mislead us to ignore some fundamental differences between Chen and 
Ranke. 
While Ranke had lived in a Christian world still comparatively at 
peace with its theological assumption of divine providence and untroubled 
by the devastating experiences of the twentieth century, Chen could not fall 
back on a Christian God for solace. At the same time he was – far more 
than Ranke – confronted with far-reaching political, social, and cultural 
changes,37 which brought about the rapid decline of his Confucian world, a 
                                                 
34 This is not only manifest in Chen’s writings on history, but is also made clear in 
his writings on language, especially on the relationship between Chinese and foreign 
grammar, see Chen Yinke, ‘Yü Liu Shuya jiaoshou lun guowen shiti shu’ 
與劉叔雅教授論國文試題書 (Letter to Professor Liu Shuya Discussing the 
Questions for the Chinese Examinations) in: Xueheng (Critical Review) 79 (1931) 
see: CYKWC II:3, 221-228. 
35 Wang Rongzu, Shijia Chen Yinke zhuan, 53-57. 
36 Chen Yinke studied in Germany from 1909 to 1911, and from 1921 to 1926, a 
time when the dilemma of late historicism became apparent and was widely 
discussed e.g. by Ernst Troeltsch and, with quite different conclusions, by Friedrich 
Meinecke. See: Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (München 1936); 
Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme (Tübingen 1922); Idem, Der 
Historismus und seine Überwindung (Berlin 1924). 
37 Chen Yinke’s opinion that Wang Guowei’s objectives of protecting and 
continuing traditional Chinese culture were illusionary due to the overall social, 
economic and political change, and that this fact was the reason for his suicide, is 
evidence that Chen was quite aware of this dilemma of historicism. It is clear from 
Chen’s repeated affirmation of the values Wang was fighting for that this applies to 




decline at least accelerated by a civilization more different from the Chinese 
world than France had ever been different from Germany. 
This may explain why Chen, comparable to European late histo-
ricism, tried to conceptualize a view of history capable of accommodating 
change without, however, necessarily leading to a breach of continuity and 
identity. He achieved this by means of a methodology that took historicity 
and culturality seriously. It is true that he – as did Ranke – conceived of 
meaning as to be immanent in history, but at the same time, he 
acknowledged that this meaning is mediated by the observer. Comparable 
to Dilthey’s historical methodology, Chen seems to conceptualize historical 
meaning as the product of a dialogical process between manifestations of 
past human endeavors and present interested perspectives, integrated under 
the umbrella of overarching and coherent ethical and cultural orientations.38 
Deprived of any metaphysical foundation and opposed to a progressive 
universal Telos, Chen embraced a view of history that left much more room 
for intercultural diversity and intracultural plurality. 
The case of Chen Yinke’s historiography clearly evinces that some 
Chinese historians from the Republican period tried to come to grips with 
the same problematic of historicity and relativism typical for modernity, as 
their European counterparts. I hence propose an interpretation of Chinese 
concepts regarding the relation between historicity, national particularity 
and the question of universal standards that not only takes so-called 
conservative approaches into account, but one that also suggests that these 
approaches have not been as marginal as is sometimes assumed. It is true, 
that Chen Yinke was an exceptional case, but an analysis of the 
historiography of historians affiliated with the Xueheng group reveals that 
their view of history, culture, and the nation was less hegemonic and much 
more pluralistic than hitherto assumed.39 However, it is also true, that these 
approaches have long been neglected. There are many reasons for this, but 
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38 Barash, Martin Heidegger; Rüsen, Konfigurationen des Historismus. 
39 See e.g. the historiography of Tang Yongtong, Zhang Yinlin, Miao Fenglin, Liu 
Yizheng, Zheng Hesheng and others. I am currently working on a monograph on 
so-called ‘conservative’ historians and intellectuals of the post May Fourth period 
including these historians as well as Du Yaquan, Liang Qichao, Zhang Taiyan, 
Zhang Shizhao and others. 




three important factors come to my mind, which might explain this peculiar 
phenomenon: 
First, due to their view of history, some of these intellectuals 
consciously avoided politics, thereby considerably reducing their influence 
on public discussions. This, however, does not mean that they exerted no 
influence at all. Quite a few of them wrote multi-volume histories of China 
and Chinese culture that were widely read and often referred to.40
Second, due to their opposition against the view of history as 
propagated by so-called liberals and leftists, they were, at best, stigmatized 
as conservative, if not banned completely from state-official historiography – 
for a long time an influential source of information on China. 
Third, and perhaps most important, their concepts of history do not 
easily fit into notions of progressive history and directly challenge the 
ideological supremacy of the West. It might have been their ‘obstinacy to 
surrender’ that concealed them from our investigations, an ‘obstinacy’ much 
more fundamental than the nationalist anti-imperialism of historians like Fu 
Sinian, Guo Muoruo, or even Gu Jiegang. 
 
                                                 
40 See e.g. Liu Yizheng 柳詒徵, ‘Zhongguo wenhuashi’ 中國文化史 (History of 
Chinese Culture) first published serialized in Xueheng 49-54, 56, 58, 61, 63, 64, 67, 
70, 72, 75 (January 1926 until March 1931). Published as monograph in Nanjing, 
1932.
